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This	  article	  examines	  anti-­‐Chinese	  hate	  speech	  in	  Mongolia	  and	  argues	  that	  in	  spite	  of	  
its	  prevalence	  and	  pervasiveness	  it	  remains	  limited	  to	  a	  Mongolian	  audience,	  
essentially	  constituting	  a	  vector	  of	  social	  policing.	  Its	  violence	  is	  thus	  largely	  exerted	  
on	  Mongolian	  citizens	  themselves,	  particularly	  those	  “bad	  subjects”	  whose	  personal	  
and	  intimate	  aspirations	  do	  not	  dovetail	  with	  the	  “good	  of	  the	  nation.”	  Through	  an	  
ethnographic	  focus	  on	  Mongolian	  women,	  I	  illustrate	  how	  the	  experience	  of	  “bad	  
subjects”	  intersects	  with	  nationalist	  narratives,	  both	  undercutting	  them	  and	  
contributing	  to	  their	  perpetuation.	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Since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  socialist	  period	  in	  1990,	  and	  in	  particular	  since	  the	  mid	  2000s,	  
Mongolia	  has	  witnessed	  a	  strong	  increase	  in	  xenophobia.	  To	  an	  extent,	  this	  situation	  is	  
reflective	  of	  the	  broader	  move	  towards	  far-­‐right	  politics	  that	  is	  taking	  place	  
throughout	  the	  former	  socialist	  region	  where	  racially	  motivated	  attacks	  have	  been	  on	  
the	  rise	  (King	  2010,	  Likhachev	  2007).	  But	  while	  countries	  such	  as	  Russia	  or	  Ukraine	  
have	  seen	  the	  emergence	  of	  blanket	  xenophobia	  towards	  all	  kinds	  of	  (non-­‐white)	  
foreigners,	  nationalist	  narratives	  in	  Mongolia	  have	  focused	  almost	  exclusively	  on	  
China.	  In	  the	  last	  decade,	  Mongolian	  public	  discourse	  has	  been	  saturated	  with	  anti-­‐
Chinese	  statements	  and	  acts	  of	  violence	  against	  Chinese	  citizens,	  but	  also	  against	  
Mongols	  fraternizing	  with	  Chinese,	  have	  become	  an	  increasingly	  common	  occurrence.	  
Popular	  songs,	  as	  well	  as	  graffiti	  found	  throughout	  the	  capital	  city	  Ulaanbaatar,	  
explicitly	  call	  for	  the	  expulsion	  (and	  occasionally	  murder)	  of	  Chinese	  citizens,	  and	  
nationalist	  groups	  have	  issued	  statements	  warning	  they	  would	  shave	  off	  the	  hair	  of	  
women	  having	  sexual	  relations	  with	  Chinese	  men	  (Jargal	  2007).	  Many	  rumors	  
concerning	  alleged	  attempts	  by	  China	  to	  conquer	  the	  country	  through	  various	  
deceitful	  means	  circulate	  in	  the	  Mongolian	  social	  body:	  the	  Chinese	  are	  suspected	  of	  
growing	  poisonous	  vegetables	  to	  kill	  off	  the	  Mongols,	  of	  sending	  Chinese	  men	  to	  
Mongolia	  to	  reproduce	  with	  local	  women	  in	  order	  to	  sire	  Chinese	  offspring,	  and	  of	  




If	  nationalist	  extremists	  are	  a	  minority	  and	  are	  frequently	  criticized	  by	  the	  Mongolian	  
majority	  for	  their	  excessive	  violence	  (Bolormaa	  2007),	  research	  suggests	  that	  a	  
sizeable	  proportion	  of	  Mongols	  subscribes	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  China	  has	  territorial	  and	  
political	  ambitions	  over	  Mongolia	  and	  that	  the	  nationalists’	  basic	  premise	  is	  valid	  (Billé	  
2008,	  2010a).	  Anti-­‐Chinese	  sentiments	  are	  conceptualized,	  by	  both	  Mongolian	  and	  
foreign	  scholars	  (Bulag	  1998,	  Rossabi	  2005),	  primarily	  as	  the	  product	  of	  fraught	  
historical	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  groups,	  and	  frequently	  rationalized	  as	  Mongolian	  
endeavors	  to	  defend	  their	  country	  and	  preserve	  independence.	  Often	  reductively	  
interpreted	  as	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  China’s	  rise	  (Branigan	  2010),	  Mongolian	  
xenophobia	  is	  in	  fact	  inextricably	  tied	  to	  local	  conceptualizations	  of	  ethnicity,	  the	  
destabilization	  of	  gender	  roles	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  urban	  modernity	  (Billé	  2010a).	  
	  
Closer	  investigation	  of	  this	  hate	  speech	  reveals	  surprising	  contradictions	  and	  
inconsistencies.	  Thus,	  despite	  the	  widespread	  rumors	  concerning	  poisonous	  Chinese	  
produce,	  Chinese	  restaurants	  are	  very	  popular	  in	  Ulaanbaatar,	  including	  with	  people	  
who	  are	  most	  vocal	  about	  their	  anti-­‐Chinese	  sentiments.	  More	  importantly,	  as	  this	  
discourse	  takes	  place	  in	  Mongolian,	  a	  language	  which	  does	  not	  have	  transethnic	  
reach,	  it	  tends	  to	  linguistically	  exclude	  Chinese.	  As	  the	  data	  in	  this	  paper	  will	  illustrate,	  
while	  overtly	  directed	  at	  the	  Chinese,	  the	  actual	  audience	  of	  these	  messages	  tend	  to	  
be	  limited	  to	  Mongols	  themselves.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  may	  be	  construed	  as	  a	  “China-­‐
themed”	  intraethnic	  nationalist	  discourse,	  ostensibly	  about	  the	  Chinese,	  but	  in	  effect	  
by	  and	  for	  Mongols.	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Anti-­‐Chinese	  discourse	  thus	  essentially	  operates	  as	  a	  vector	  of	  social	  cohesion,	  
seeking	  to	  create	  unity	  against	  a	  common	  enemy.	  As	  a	  choral,	  reiterative	  activity,	  
Sinophobia	  constitutes	  a	  patriotic	  reaffirmation	  of	  Mongolianness.	  But	  if	  anti-­‐Chinese	  
sentiments	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  nation	  have	  largely	  come	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  
equivalent	  and	  therefore	  beneficial	  to	  Mongols	  as	  a	  group,	  this	  discourse	  also	  has	  
significant	  internal	  consequences	  for	  Mongolian	  society.	  The	  subjects	  of	  ethnic	  
violence	  are	  more	  often	  than	  not	  Mongols	  themselves,	  in	  particular	  those	  citizens	  
whose	  personal	  and	  intimate	  aspirations	  do	  not	  fully	  dovetail	  with	  prevailing	  ideas	  
about	  what	  Mongolianness	  is.	  Potentially	  these	  “bad	  subjects”	  can	  encompass	  a	  large	  
swathe	  of	  the	  citizenry,	  from	  elites	  and	  politicians,	  to	  people	  with	  foreign	  heritage,	  or	  
ethnic	  and	  sexual	  minorities,	  but	  it	  is	  perhaps	  women	  who,	  as	  a	  group,	  find	  
themselves	  most	  problematically	  positioned	  with	  respect	  to	  national	  narratives.	  The	  
ethnography	  presented	  in	  this	  paper	  specifically	  addresses	  female	  experiences	  of	  
nationalist	  anti-­‐Chinese	  discourse,	  thereby	  highlighting	  the	  centripetal	  homogenizing	  
force	  exerted	  on	  Mongolian	  citizens	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  nation.	  
	  
The	  ethnographic	  material	  presented	  in	  this	  paper	  was	  collected	  over	  a	  period	  of	  
thirteen	  months	  spent	  in	  Ulaanbaatar	  between	  fall	  2006	  and	  fall	  2007.	  Additional	  
material	  was	  gathered	  during	  a	  brief	  follow-­‐up	  visit	  in	  summer	  2009,	  as	  well	  as	  
through	  internet	  media	  in	  the	  interim	  and	  since.	  Loosely	  structured	  interviews	  were	  
carried	  out	  with	  two	  dozens	  individuals	  recruited	  through	  the	  snowball	  method,	  and	  
supplementary	  views	  and	  opinions	  were	  also	  collected	  through	  direct	  observation	  and	  
in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  media	  sources.	  The	  media	  I	  monitored	  in	  the	  course	  of	  my	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research	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  newspapers,	  but	  included	  other	  cultural	  modes	  of	  
expression	  such	  as	  films,	  graffiti,	  songs,	  and	  music	  videos.	  
	  
Sinophobia as Communitas 
I	  met	  Mergen1	  during	  a	  trip	  to	  Hövsgöl	  lake	  in	  July	  2007.	  He	  had	  been	  recommended	  
to	  me	  as	  a	  reliable	  guide	  through	  a	  mutual	  friend	  in	  Ulaanbaatar.	  Like	  for	  many	  people	  
in	  the	  region,	  his	  work	  was	  seasonal.	  Making	  most	  of	  his	  annual	  earnings	  in	  the	  
summer	  through	  his	  work	  as	  a	  guide	  to	  foreign	  tourists,	  in	  the	  winter	  he	  tried	  his	  luck	  
in	  Ulaanbaatar,	  working	  in	  bars	  or	  restaurants.	  Although	  usually	  eager	  to	  practice	  his	  
English	  with	  “his”	  tourists,	  he	  was	  happy	  to	  become	  the	  teacher	  for	  once	  and	  often	  
spoke	  with	  me	  in	  Mongolian.	  It	  didn’t	  take	  long	  for	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  Chinese	  to	  come	  
up	  and	  I	  used	  this	  opportunity	  to	  tease	  out	  his	  feelings	  and	  experience	  in	  that	  regard.	  
His	  responses	  were	  typical	  and	  therefore	  rather	  surprising	  for	  me.	  In	  spite	  of	  a	  virtual	  
absence	  of	  Chinese	  people	  in	  his	  village	  or	  in	  the	  neighboring	  regional	  capital	  of	  
Mörön,	  in	  the	  very	  north	  of	  the	  country,	  his	  statements	  were	  a	  perfect	  echo	  of	  what	  I	  
had	  been	  hearing	  from	  Ulaanbaatarites:	  the	  Chinese	  were	  a	  terrible	  bunch,	  they	  had	  
oppressed	  the	  Mongols	  for	  centuries,	  and	  were	  now	  eager	  to	  take	  the	  country	  back.	  
When	  the	  discussion	  veered	  towards	  intermarriage,	  he	  was	  similarly	  emphatic:	  “If	  I	  
got	  married	  to	  a	  Chinese	  girl,	  my	  parents	  would	  kill	  me!”	  He	  envisaged	  that	  some	  
Mongolian	  girls	  may	  be	  tempted	  into	  marrying	  the	  handful	  of	  Chinese	  men	  living	  in	  
the	  city	  (i.e.	  Mörön),	  but	  only	  if	  they	  were	  rich.	  Just	  like	  other	  interlocutors	  in	  the	  
capital,	  he	  believed	  that	  money	  was	  the	  only	  rationale	  behind	  potential	  Sino-­‐
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Mongolian	  unions.	  For	  him,	  in	  a	  clear	  echo	  of	  the	  dominant	  discourse,	  love	  and	  
affection	  were	  not	  part	  of	  the	  Chinese	  equation.	  
	  
These	  statements	  about	  the	  Chinese,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  an	  absence	  of	  any	  personal	  
experience	  were	  rather	  problematic.	  Despite	  their	  reiterative	  and	  quasi-­‐formulaic	  
quality,	  they	  were	  clearly	  more	  than	  general	  opinions	  acquired	  through	  schooling	  or	  
informal	  networks.	  Discussions	  about	  the	  Chinese	  routinely	  elicited	  highly	  emotional	  
responses	  that	  bespoke	  a	  strong	  engagement	  with	  the	  topic.	  However,	  a	  closer	  look	  
at	  the	  apparent	  contradiction	  between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  formulaicity	  of	  such	  
speech,	  augmented	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  direct	  personal	  knowledge,	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	  
emotionality	  and	  affective	  involvement,	  can	  help	  tease	  out	  a	  number	  of	  theoretically	  
productive	  hypotheses.	  I	  propose	  to	  build	  in	  particular	  on	  the	  discussion	  by	  Yurchak	  
(2006)	  and	  his	  application,	  in	  the	  Soviet	  context,	  of	  Austin’s	  (1962)	  distinction	  
between	  constative	  and	  performative	  speech.	  ”Constative”	  is	  the	  term	  used	  by	  Austin	  
for	  referential	  speech,	  i.e.	  speech	  which	  states	  facts	  and	  describes	  reality,	  while	  
“performative”	  is	  a	  special	  class	  of	  speech	  in	  which	  the	  enunciation	  constitutes	  an	  
action.	  Austin	  gave	  as	  examples	  of	  performatives	  such	  utterances	  as	  “I	  name	  this	  ship	  
the	  Queen	  Elizabeth”	  or	  “I	  bet	  you	  sixpence	  it	  will	  rain	  tomorrow”	  (Austin	  1962,	  5)	  but	  
this	  category	  can	  be	  extended	  more	  widely	  to	  encompass	  other	  types	  of	  statements	  
that	  do	  something	  rather	  than	  merely	  describe	  something.	  
	  
Expanding	  on	  Austin’s	  point	  that	  constatives	  and	  performatives	  cannot	  easily	  be	  
divided	  in	  a	  living	  language	  and	  that	  all	  utterances	  somehow	  perform	  both	  roles,	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Yurchak	  proposes	  to	  look	  at	  both	  as	  dimensions	  of	  discourse,	  indivisible	  and	  mutually	  
constitutive	  rather	  than	  binary	  oppositions	  (2006,	  23).	  He	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  
the	  normalization	  of	  all	  forms	  of	  authoritative	  discourse	  that	  helps	  the	  shift	  from	  the	  
constative	  to	  the	  performative	  (2006,	  59).	  
	  
The	  situations	  described	  by	  Yurchak	  in	  which	  Soviet	  citizens	  would	  take	  on	  a	  fully	  
participatory	  role	  in	  the	  electoral	  process	  in	  spite	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  candidate	  choice,	  was	  
also	  seen	  in	  Mongolia	  with	  respect	  to	  political	  activity.	  Describing	  a	  political	  meeting	  
in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  socialist	  period,	  Strasser	  notes	  the	  fraternal	  atmosphere	  and	  
the	  participatory	  role	  played	  by	  Mongols,	  despite	  the	  speeches	  being	  in	  Russian	  and	  
therefore	  not	  comprehensible	  to	  the	  majority:	  
	  
The	  speeches	  were	  in	  Russian,	  which	  Mongolians	  tried	  to	  use	  with	  more	  or	  
less	  success,	  and	  though	  few	  understood	  it	  there	  was	  always	  great	  
applause	  of	  ‘Za’.	  .	  .	  Finally	  all	  rose	  to	  sing	  the	  ‘International,’	  and	  the	  
Mongolian	  hymn,	  after	  which	  a	  scramble	  began,	  the	  crowd	  being	  like	  a	  lot	  
of	  children	  leaving	  school.	  (Strasser	  1930:	  266)	  
	  
This	  participation	  and	  voicing	  of	  agreement	  with	  the	  utterance	  of	  za	  (a	  term	  here	  
functionally	  equivalent	  to	  “yes”)	  cannot	  be	  circumscribed	  to	  a	  constative	  statement	  
since	  the	  actual	  content	  was	  not	  linguistically	  accessible	  to	  most	  of	  the	  audience.	  Here	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the	  utterances	  are	  performative:	  what	  matters	  is	  the	  participation	  in	  these	  novel	  
practices.	  Russian	  is	  here	  not	  a	  bearer	  of	  linguistic	  but	  of	  symbolic	  meaning,	  one	  of	  
many	  elements	  in	  a	  kit	  of	  modernity,	  like	  the	  Russian	  boots	  and	  military	  caps,	  the	  
“leather	  cases”	  and	  the	  “tight-­‐laced	  Mongolian	  coats	  of	  blue	  and	  raspberry	  pink”	  
described	  by	  Strasser.	  Through	  these	  utterances	  and	  new	  sartorial	  practices,	  the	  
Mongols	  are	  “performing	  modernity.”	  
	  
Pointing	  out	  the	  difficulties	  in	  creating	  a	  binary	  division	  between	  form	  and	  meaning,	  
real	  meaning	  and	  pretense,	  Yurchak	  shows	  that	  new	  meanings	  can	  in	  fact	  be	  
produced	  through	  repetition	  of	  authoritative	  speech	  acts	  (2006,	  28).	  This	  
performative	  dimension	  offers	  new	  meanings	  to	  statements	  such	  as	  anti-­‐Chinese	  
injurious	  speech,2	  which,	  on	  the	  surface,	  first	  appears	  to	  be	  both	  normative	  and	  
unreflective.	  These	  new	  meanings	  are	  not	  necessarily	  positioned	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  
dominant	  discourse	  but,	  as	  a	  “citational	  practice”	  (see	  Butler	  1997);	  they	  come	  to	  take	  
on	  a	  new	  dimension	  precisely	  on	  account	  of	  this	  reiteration.	  	  
	  
So	  while	  an	  anti-­‐Chinese	  statement	  may	  be,	  in	  part,	  a	  reflection	  of	  personally-­‐held	  
beliefs,	  it	  also	  serves	  as	  a	  conduit	  for	  ideas	  and	  opinions	  that	  circulate	  in	  the	  social	  
body	  and	  that	  may	  be	  acceptable	  and/or	  expectable.	  This	  socially-­‐situated	  knowledge	  
circulates	  informally	  through	  rumors	  (see	  Billé	  2008)	  but	  is	  also	  formally	  taught	  
through	  histories	  that	  emphasize	  the	  role	  of	  China	  as	  Mongolia’s	  main	  foe.	  This	  
spectral	  image	  of	  China	  has	  also	  been	  explicitly	  articulated	  in	  the	  Mongolian	  political	  
arena	  where	  politicians,	  particularly	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  elections,	  are	  routinely	  accused	  of	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pro-­‐China	  leanings	  and	  Chinese	  heritage	  (Baabar	  2005,	  Erdembileg	  2007,	  Rossabi	  
2005).	  If,	  as	  I	  have	  argued	  elsewhere	  (Billé	  2010a),	  Mongolian	  modern	  identity	  is	  
contingent	  on	  a	  formal	  and	  absolute	  separation	  from	  China,	  then	  anti-­‐Chinese	  
sentiments	  may	  be	  construed	  as	  a	  form	  of	  paranationalist	  discourse	  aiming	  at	  eliciting	  
social	  cohesion	  and	  group	  pride,	  essentially	  a	  vector	  for	  a	  sense	  of	  Mongolian	  
communitas.	  
	  
My	  suggestion	  that	  anti-­‐Chinese	  discourse	  in	  Mongolia	  should	  be	  understood	  through	  
its	  performative	  dimension	  rather	  than	  simply	  at	  a	  constative	  level	  is	  also	  supported	  
by	  the	  very	  formulaicity	  of	  anti-­‐Chinese	  discourse.	  These	  statements	  do	  not	  bring	  any	  
new	  pieces	  of	  information	  to	  the	  listeners,	  merely	  new	  examples	  that	  reinforce	  
common	  assumptions	  and	  stereotypes.	  What	  they	  do	  is	  to	  elicit	  a	  renewed	  sense	  of	  
outrage,	  fear	  and	  anger	  as	  well	  as	  stoke	  national	  fervor	  and	  narcissism.	  In	  fact,	  the	  
very	  formulaicity	  of	  these	  statements	  weakens	  the	  original,	  constative	  dimension:	  like	  
a	  ritual,	  the	  actual	  words	  uttered	  are	  less	  important	  than	  context	  or	  repetition.	  	  
	  
Internal Violence 
The	  political	  narratives	  positing	  national	  autonomy	  as	  the	  teleological	  destiny	  of	  
Mongols,	  obtained	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  Russians	  but	  always	  at	  the	  peril	  of	  being	  
snatched	  away	  by	  the	  Chinese	  through	  various	  deceitful	  means,	  convey	  the	  
rationalizations	  that	  Sinophobia	  is	  a	  valid	  emotional	  response,	  articulated	  as	  self-­‐
defense.	  However	  the	  violence	  (both	  actual	  and	  symbolic)	  witnessed	  in	  Mongolia	  and	  
directed	  at	  the	  Chinese	  also	  has	  a	  direct	  centripetal	  effect	  on	  Mongolian	  society	  to	  the	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extent	  that	  it	  enforces	  homogenization.	  Defense	  against	  Chinese	  political	  and	  cultural	  
encroachment	  has	  led	  to	  a	  standardization	  of	  Mongolianness,	  guarding	  against	  
external	  but	  also	  internal	  divergence.	  The	  central	  position	  of	  the	  Halh	  majority	  group,	  
as	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  Bulag	  (1998),	  is	  one	  such	  consequence.	  As	  protectors	  of	  
political	  and	  cultural	  authenticity,	  the	  Halh	  have	  come	  to	  stand	  as	  the	  emblematic	  
“genuine	  Mongol”	  (jinhene	  mongol)	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  forced	  Halhification	  has	  meant	  a	  
lower	  status	  for	  minority	  groups	  within	  Mongolia.	  Buryats,	  already	  positioned	  as	  
somewhat	  liminal	  to	  Mongolianness	  prior	  to	  the	  socialist	  period	  (Lattimore	  1962:	  8),	  
are	  mostly	  considered	  as	  non	  Mongols	  in	  contemporary	  Mongolia,	  while	  other	  groups,	  
such	  as	  the	  Monchak	  of	  western	  Mongolia,	  lack	  any	  kind	  of	  formal	  recognition	  (see	  
Harrison	  2007).	  
	  
But	  violence	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  national	  autonomy.	  While	  overtly	  and	  
explicitly	  directed	  at	  China,	  symbolic	  and	  actual	  violence	  targets,	  in	  fact,	  Mongols	  
themselves.	  Sinophobia	  functions	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  discipline	  the	  Mongolian	  social	  body	  in	  
an	  attempt	  to	  rally	  the	  group	  around	  the	  notion	  of	  collective	  good.	  By	  defining	  the	  
rules	  of	  acceptable	  social	  behavior,	  this	  discourse	  encodes	  as	  selfish	  actors	  and	  
traitors	  those	  who	  do	  not	  comply.	  But	  this	  internal	  violence	  is	  not	  distributed	  equally,	  
and	  social	  policing	  operates	  along	  lines	  that	  are	  heavily	  gendered	  and	  
heteronormative.	  For	  women,	  gays	  and	  lesbians,	  or	  other	  groups	  who	  do	  not	  align	  
with	  the	  national	  project	  and	  who,	  in	  effect,	  resist	  against	  resistance,	  penalties	  can	  be	  
heavy	  (Billé	  2010b).	  	  It	  is	  important,	  however,	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  these	  prohibitions	  
are	  in	  no	  way	  limited	  to	  these	  groups,	  and	  that	  disregard	  for	  social	  norms	  can	  have	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fatal	  consequences	  for	  others	  as	  well.	  Kandiyoti	  (1991)	  has	  highlighted	  the	  disconnect	  
between	  national	  aspirations	  and	  women,	  but	  this	  disconnect	  is	  also	  visible	  at	  other	  
intersections.	  Thus	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  nationalist	  group	  Höh	  Mongol	  was	  imprisoned	  for	  
murdering	  his	  daughter’s	  boyfriend,	  who	  allegedly	  had	  studied	  Chinese	  and	  had	  
established	  cultural	  links	  with	  China.	  
	  
This	  latter	  example	  is,	  I	  argue,	  especially	  telling.	  Despite	  very	  violent	  anti-­‐Chinese	  
rhetoric	  calling	  for	  the	  murder	  of	  Chinese	  and	  the	  defense	  of	  outnumbered	  Mongols,	  
the	  actual	  victims	  of	  the	  nationalist	  groups	  Dayaar	  Mongol	  and	  Höh	  Mongol	  appear	  to	  
be	  largely	  Mongols	  themselves.	  In	  2007,	  for	  instance,	  Dayaar	  Mongol	  issued	  the	  
warning	  that	  they	  would	  shave	  the	  heads	  of	  prostitutes	  having	  sexual	  relations	  with	  
Chinese	  men	  (Jargal	  2007),	  and	  later	  broadcast	  videos	  online	  bragging	  about	  having	  
“punished”	  women	  in	  this	  way.	  
	  
This	  contradiction,	  compounded	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  anti-­‐Chinese	  discourse	  is	  not	  
linguistically	  accessible	  to	  most	  Chinese,	  suggests	  that	  Sinophobia	  operates	  largely	  at	  
an	  intraethnic	  level.	  The	  violence	  attached	  to	  this	  discourse	  is	  also	  internal	  insofar	  as	  it	  
takes	  place	  between	  Mongols:	  it	  warns	  and	  disciplines	  other	  Mongols	  and	  acts	  on	  
Mongolian	  bodies.	  
	  
Throughout	  the	  socialist	  and	  post-­‐socialist	  period,	  China	  has	  often	  been	  used	  as	  a	  
proxy	  for	  other	  kinds	  of	  dangers,	  many	  of	  them	  internal	  (Erdembileg	  2007).	  During	  the	  
socialist	  period,	  the	  most	  immediate	  human-­‐driven3	  danger	  faced	  by	  Mongols	  came	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from	  other	  Mongols	  in	  the	  guise	  of	  purges	  and	  informers	  even	  if	  fears	  converged	  on	  
outside	  threats	  such	  as	  China	  or	  Japan.	  In	  post-­‐socialist	  Mongolia,	  the	  source	  of	  
danger	  voiced	  in	  the	  media	  and	  in	  informal	  conversation	  points	  to	  China,	  but	  more	  
visible	  and	  pressing	  issues	  are	  arguably	  those	  of	  corruption,	  poverty,	  homelessness,	  
alcoholism	  and	  environmental	  pollution.	  These	  matters	  are	  certainly	  very	  much	  
present	  in	  media	  forums	  as	  well	  but	  they	  rarely	  elicit	  the	  same	  passion	  and	  fury.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  Also	  lacking	  sufficient	  visibility	  is	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  marital	  violence.	  Some	  studies4	  
have	  estimated	  that	  one	  in	  three	  women	  in	  Mongolia	  is	  affected	  by	  domestic	  violence.	  
If,	  increasingly,	  resources	  are	  being	  allocated	  to	  address	  the	  problem,	  a	  certain	  
tolerance	  of	  marital	  violence	  as	  “traditional”	  and	  a	  cultural	  reluctance	  to	  air	  “family	  
issues”	  in	  public	  are	  proving	  a	  difficult	  combination	  to	  overcome	  (Benwell	  2006).	  
Despite	  the	  general	  perception	  by	  Mongols	  that	  Mongolian	  women	  are	  emancipated	  
and	  “free,”	  various	  traditions	  and	  proverbs	  illustrate	  the	  prevalent	  acceptability	  of	  
wife-­‐beating	  in	  Mongolian	  culture.	  According	  to	  some	  scholars,	  the	  situation	  may	  
have	  been	  exacerbated	  in	  recent	  years	  by	  the	  increasing	  feminization	  in	  education	  
and	  on	  the	  workplace	  as	  levels	  of	  alcoholism	  and	  employment	  rise	  for	  men,	  making	  
disaffected	  young	  men	  more	  likely	  to	  turn	  to	  violence	  (Benwell	  2006:	  133;	  Bamana	  
2008:	  62).	  
	  
In	  such	  a	  context,	  the	  forces	  mobilized	  in	  defense	  of	  national	  independence	  and	  in	  the	  
name	  of	  social	  cohesion	  against	  an	  external	  enemy	  can	  start	  feeling	  restrictive	  to	  a	  
number	  of	  a	  nation’s	  citizens.	  And	  given	  the	  strong	  biological	  dimension	  of	  the	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discourse,	  namely	  that	  the	  Mongolian	  gene	  pool	  must	  be	  preserved	  at	  all	  costs,	  some	  
groups	  find	  themselves	  at	  a	  very	  different	  juncture	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  a	  “traditional	  enemy”	  such	  
as	  China:	  namely	  women,	  as	  bearers	  of	  ethnic	  and	  biological	  continuity,	  and	  gay	  men,	  
who	  do	  not	  fit	  the	  heteronormative	  and	  reproductive	  ideals	  of	  the	  nation.	  But	  while	  
China	  is	  routinely	  depicted	  as	  the	  main	  danger	  against	  which	  to	  rally,	  Mongolia’s	  
southern	  neighbor	  is	  not	  necessarily	  perceived	  as	  such	  by	  all	  Mongols.	  In	  fact,	  for	  
some	  at	  least,	  China	  may	  even	  open	  up	  spaces	  of	  potentiality	  and	  liberties	  
unattainable	  to	  them	  within	  Mongolia.	  
 
Interpellations 
However	  before	  discussing	  some	  of	  the	  experiences	  of	  these	  “bad	  subjects,”	  I	  would	  
like	  to	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  discourse	  operates,	  who	  speaks	  it,	  
whom	  it	  interpellates,	  and	  what	  some	  of	  its	  unintended	  consequences	  might	  be.	  
According	  to	  philosopher	  Louis	  Althusser	  (1971)	  “interpellation”	  is	  the	  process	  
whereby	  ideology,	  by	  addressing	  an	  individual,	  transforms	  her	  into	  a	  subject.	  The	  
famous	  example	  he	  provides	  is	  that	  of	  a	  policeman	  calling	  out	  to	  an	  individual	  —	  “hey,	  
you!”	  —	  who	  by	  turning	  round	  and	  responding	  is	  in	  effect	  hailed	  into	  existence.	  
Elaborating	  on	  Althusser’s	  concept	  as	  well	  as	  on	  Austin’s	  (1962)	  speech	  act	  theory,	  
Butler	  (1997)	  has	  shown	  how	  “hate	  speech”	  interpellates	  the	  injured	  party	  as	  a	  special	  
kind	  of	  subject.	  Through	  its	  invocation	  of	  convention	  and	  its	  sedimented	  meanings,	  
hate	  speech	  gives	  the	  utterance	  its	  force	  (Butler	  1997,	  36).	  More	  importantly,	  she	  
points	  out	  that	  through	  its	  judicial	  language,	  the	  state	  “actively	  produces	  the	  domain	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of	  publically	  acceptable	  speech,	  demarcating	  the	  line	  between	  the	  domains	  of	  the	  
speakable	  and	  the	  unspeakable,	  and	  retaining	  the	  power	  to	  make	  and	  sustain	  that	  
consequential	  line	  of	  demarcation”	  (p.77).	  This	  latter	  point	  was	  in	  fact	  commented	  on	  
by	  my	  friend	  Batsaihan,	  an	  Inner	  Mongol	  living	  in	  Ulaanbaatar,	  where	  he	  owns	  a	  
restaurant,	  who	  exclaimed:	  
	  
Here	  there	  are	  graffiti	  saying	  “Kill	  all	  Chinese”	  but	  you	  would	  never	  hear	  
anything	  like	  that	  in	  China!	  The	  government	  wouldn’t	  allow	  people	  to	  say	  
such	  things.	  But	  here	  the	  government	  doesn’t	  care,	  they	  don’t	  take	  any	  
stance!	  
	  
For	  him,	  the	  permissiveness	  of	  the	  Mongolian	  state	  with	  regards	  to	  hate	  speech	  was	  
not	  simply	  a	  symptom	  of	  weakness	  or	  an	  indication	  of	  democracy.	  He	  saw	  it	  as	  an	  
implicit	  agreement,	  just	  as	  the	  vigilantes	  who	  had	  broken	  the	  signs	  of	  a	  number	  of	  
Chinese	  restaurants	  in	  the	  area	  had	  been	  given	  free	  rein	  and	  not	  held	  accountable	  
(Bolormaa	  2007,	  Billé	  2008).	  While	  convincing,	  the	  interpellation	  dimension	  in	  Butler’s	  
discussion	  with	  regards	  to	  hate	  speech	  is	  difficult	  to	  apply	  in	  the	  Mongolian	  context.	  
Interpellation	  as	  a	  way	  of	  producing	  subjects	  is	  contingent	  on	  the	  understanding	  of	  
the	  address	  by	  the	  addressee,	  but	  in	  Mongolia	  this	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  With	  the	  
exception	  of	  permanent	  residents,	  the	  majority	  of	  Han	  Chinese	  do	  not	  understand	  or	  
read	  Mongolian.5	  Sightings	  of	  injurious	  graffiti	  in	  Chinese	  have	  been	  reported	  to	  me	  
by	  Batsaihan,	  and	  a	  few	  in	  English	  also	  exist,	  but	  the	  vast	  majority	  are	  in	  Mongolian.	  
As	  far	  as	  I	  was	  able	  to	  observe,	  direct	  interpellations	  are	  also	  rare,	  and	  anti-­‐Chinese	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sentiments	  are	  not	  usually	  voiced	  openly,	  unless	  the	  person	  clearly	  does	  not	  speak	  
Mongolian.6	  In	  fact,	  interviews	  carried	  out	  with	  Chinese	  permanent	  settlers	  suggest	  
that	  the	  older	  generation,	  which	  does	  not	  speak	  Mongolian	  well,	  may	  not	  even	  be	  
fully	  aware	  of	  these	  sentiments.	  
	  
Thus,	  if	  anti-­‐Chinese	  speech	  is	  an	  interpellation,	  it	  is	  not	  immediately	  clear	  whom	  it	  
interpellates.	  It	  does	  not	  speak	  to,	  nor	  even	  at,	  the	  Chinese	  but	  mostly	  about	  them.	  
This	  is	  also	  true	  of	  speech	  about	  other	  foreigners.	  Near	  the	  end	  of	  my	  fieldwork	  in	  
Ulaanbaatar,	  I	  passed	  by	  a	  beggar	  while	  walking	  down	  one	  of	  the	  main	  streets.	  
Slumped	  against	  a	  wall,	  he	  extended	  his	  hand	  in	  expectation.	  In	  this	  instance	  I	  chose	  
not	  to	  give	  any	  money,	  and	  I	  merely	  shook	  my	  head	  while	  muttering	  ügüi	  (no).	  The	  
man,	  in	  an	  advanced	  state	  of	  inebriation,	  then	  shouted	  “go	  back	  to	  your	  country	  
then!”	  I	  chose	  not	  to	  respond	  and	  continued	  walking.	  
	  
Was	  this	  a	  case	  of	  interpellation,	  when	  the	  speaker	  assumed	  I	  wouldn’t	  understand?	  
Indeed,	  I	  looked	  just	  like	  one	  of	  the	  numerous	  tourists	  who	  suddenly	  become	  
omnipresent	  during	  the	  summer	  months	  in	  the	  capital.	  If	  anti-­‐Chinese	  speech	  is	  a	  
speech	  act,	  it	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  considered	  a	  form	  of	  indirect	  speech	  act	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  
it	  appears	  to	  be	  about	  the	  Chinese	  but	  is	  in	  effect	  directed	  at	  the	  Mongols	  themselves.	  
The	  Mongols	  constitute	  the	  vector	  of	  these	  speech	  acts	  and	  are	  also	  the	  ones	  to	  which	  
the	  appeal	  is	  made.	  A	  recurring	  feature	  in	  anti-­‐Chinese	  statements	  is	  the	  vocative	  
calling	  out	  to	  Mongols	  (Mongolchuud	  aa!),	  interpellating	  Mongols	  as	  fellow	  sufferers,	  
combatants,	  heroes	  and	  survivors,	  and	  warning	  them	  against	  trusting	  the	  Chinese.	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The	  readership/audience	  is	  also	  collectively	  subsumed	  under	  the	  ‘we’	  (bid)	  pronoun	  in	  
order	  to	  stress	  the	  disconnect	  between	  self	  and	  the	  Other,	  but	  the	  effect	  of	  these	  
addresses	  is	  to	  reinforce	  the	  definition	  and	  boundaries	  of	  Mongolianness	  through	  a	  
process	  of	  forced	  inclusion.	  This	  is	  also	  seen	  in	  a	  violent	  anti-­‐Chinese	  music	  video	  by	  
the	  band	  “L.A.	  Face”:	  while	  overtly	  attacking	  the	  Chinese,	  it	  in	  fact	  opens	  with	  the	  
statement	  “For	  Mongols	  only”	  (zövhön	  Mongolchuudad	  zoriulav).	  
	  
Even	  when	  the	  Mongols	  are	  not	  explicitly	  addressed,	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  this	  discourse	  
takes	  place	  in	  Mongolian,	  a	  language	  which	  does	  not	  have	  transethnic	  reach,	  tends	  to	  
limit	  the	  readership	  to	  a	  Mongolian	  audience.	  Graffiti,	  as	  textual	  signs	  embedded	  
within	  the	  urban	  fabric	  of	  the	  city,	  can	  operate	  at	  various	  levels.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  anti-­‐
Chinese	  graffiti	  mentioned	  previously	  (Fig.1),	  the	  message	  is	  unmistakably	  directed	  at	  
the	  Mongols,	  exhorting	  them	  to	  resist	  and	  take	  action:	  
	  
Ömhii	  amtai	  hujaa	  naryg	  balbaach	  balbaach	  
nutagtaa	  bid	  ezen	  n	  gedgee	  sanaach	  sanaach	  
Beat	  up,	  beat	  up	  the	  foul-­‐breath	  Chinks	  
Remember,	  remember	  that	  we	  are	  the	  masters	  in	  our	  own	  land	  
	  
The	  urgency	  of	  the	  message	  is	  emphasized	  by	  the	  grammatical	  structure:	  the	  
imperative	  in	  -­‐aach	  (balbaach;	  sanaach)	  is	  a	  form	  often	  used	  to	  express	  a	  concrete	  
demand	  or	  an	  urgent	  request	  and	  this	  sense	  of	  urgency	  is	  compounded	  by	  the	  




Figure	  1:	  “Beat	  up,	  beat	  up	  the	  foul-­‐breath	  Chinks;	  Remember,	  remember	  that	  we	  are	  
the	  masters	  in	  our	  own	  land”	  (Ömhii	  hujaa	  naryg	  balbaach	  balbaach;	  Nutagtaa	  bid	  ezen	  
n	  gedgee	  sanaach	  sanaach).	  Photo	  courtesy	  of	  Krisztina	  Teleki,	  August	  2009	  
	  
Another	  graffiti,	  which	  incidentally	  has	  gained	  notoriety	  because	  of	  its	  presence	  
throughout	  the	  city,	  reads	  “You	  mustn’t	  kill	  people,	  but	  you	  can	  kill	  the	  Chinks”	  (Hün	  
alj	  bolohgüi,	  hujaa	  naryg	  alj	  bolno)	  (Fig.2).	  Interestingly,	  this	  particular	  message	  is	  not	  
the	  direct	  exhortation	  to	  kill	  Chinese	  people	  it	  may	  at	  first	  glance	  appear	  to	  be.	  It	  is,	  
rather,	  an	  indexical	  message	  insofar	  as	  it	  points	  to	  another	  underlying	  message.	  This	  
graffiti	  does	  not	  call	  for	  murder	  but	  constitutes	  both	  a	  permission	  to	  murder	  and	  an	  
exoneration	  from	  guilt.	  More	  to	  the	  point,	  the	  assumption	  made	  here	  is	  that	  the	  
readers,	  as	  Mongols,	  have	  the	  natural	  desire	  to	  kill	  the	  Chinese,	  thereby	  indirectly	  
equating	  Mongolianness	  with	  Sinophobia.	  
	  
<insert	  Fig2.jpg>	  
Figure	  2:	  “You	  mustn’t	  kill	  people,	  but	  you	  can	  kill	  the	  Chinks”	  (Hün	  alj	  bolohgüi,	  hujaa	  
naryg	  alj	  bolno).	  Photo	  by	  the	  author,	  September	  2006	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But	  while	  the	  uneasy	  relationship	  Mongols	  have	  with	  the	  Chinese	  nation	  is	  dominated	  
by	  sentiments	  of	  hatred	  and	  mistrust,	  there	  can	  be	  a	  wide	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  
(virtually	  univocal)	  negativity	  of	  the	  discourse	  and	  actual	  practices.	  Some	  aspects	  of	  
Chinese	  traditional	  and	  popular	  culture	  are	  highly	  valued,	  like	  martial	  arts	  (in	  the	  guise	  
of	  Jackie	  Chan)	  or	  the	  hyper-­‐modernity	  of	  Singapore	  and	  Hong	  Kong.	  There	  also	  
appear	  to	  exist	  considerable	  dissimilarities	  in	  outlook	  in	  terms	  of	  class,	  with	  rich	  
Mongols	  going	  on	  shopping	  sprees	  to	  Singapore	  (aka.	  “Singa”)	  while	  poor	  Mongols	  
trade	  at	  the	  border	  with	  equally	  poor	  Chinese.	  While	  their	  socialization	  as	  Mongols	  
equips	  them	  with	  a	  similar	  set	  of	  preconceptions,	  their	  widely	  divergent	  personal	  
experience	  of	  China	  can	  either	  confirm	  or	  help	  challenge	  stereotypes.	  But	  what	  
interests	  me	  here	  is	  the	  dimension	  of	  love	  (or	  jouissance	  in	  Lacanian	  terms)	  that	  forms	  
an	  integral	  part	  of	  hate	  discourse.	  In	  his	  discussion	  of	  interpellation,	  Althusser	  argues	  
that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  subjects	  of	  ideological	  discourse	  “work	  by	  themselves”	  
(Althusser	  1971:	  181)	  but	  he	  also	  mentions	  the	  existence	  of	  others	  who	  are	  less	  
compliant	  and	  whom	  he	  terms	  “bad	  subjects.”	  His	  assumption	  is	  that	  these	  latter	  
subjects,	  who	  do	  not	  recognize	  or	  respond	  to	  calls	  to	  behave	  in	  specific,	  socially-­‐
sanctioned	  ways,	  are	  somehow	  a	  failure	  of	  socialization.	  This	  view	  is	  somewhat	  
limiting	  and	  does	  not	  elucidate	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  socialization	  occurs.	  Social	  
psychologist	  Michael	  Billig	  suggests	  instead	  that	  these	  apparent	  failures	  of	  
socialization	  are	  in	  fact	  a	  constitutive	  part	  of	  this	  process.	  By	  pointing	  at	  what	  is	  
acceptable	  and	  speakable,	  the	  behaviors	  and	  impulses	  that	  are	  negatively	  defined	  as	  
taboo	  become	  a	  particular	  object	  onto	  which	  transgressive	  desires	  become	  fixed	  
(Billig	  2004:	  94-­‐95).	  If	  Billig’s	  analysis	  is	  correct,	  then	  feelings	  of	  desire	  for	  China	  do	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not	  constitute	  a	  process	  of	  resistance	  against	  the	  dominant	  discourse	  but	  are	  on	  the	  
contrary	  epiphenomenal	  to,	  and	  produced	  by,	  this	  very	  discourse.	  
	  
This	  dimension	  of	  desire	  is	  perhaps	  at	  its	  most	  visible	  in	  its	  projected	  form,	  in	  wanting	  
to	  become	  the	  object	  of	  desire	  for	  the	  Other.	  Thus	  the	  incessant	  portrayal	  of	  Mongolia	  
as	  a	  historical	  lure	  for	  a	  powerful	  China	  constitutes	  a	  painful	  and	  horrifying	  prospect	  
but	  elicits	  a	  perverse	  sense	  of	  enjoyment	  as	  well	  (see	  Salecl	  2004:	  52).	  This	  duality	  
emerges	  in	  discussions	  of	  China,	  but	  also	  in	  narratives	  in	  which	  Mongolia	  is	  eyed	  
greedily	  or	  aggressively	  by	  powerful	  and	  exotic	  Others.	  As	  I’ve	  explored	  elsewhere	  
(Billé,	  forthcoming),	  numerous	  beliefs	  circulate	  in	  the	  Mongolian	  social	  body	  about	  
the	  alleged	  desire	  of	  various	  actors	  to	  either	  appropriate	  or	  destroy	  Mongolia,	  such	  as	  
Japan’s	  long-­‐term	  goal	  of	  resettling	  its	  surplus	  population	  in	  Mongolia,	  or	  the	  
intention	  of	  al-­‐Qaeda	  to	  bomb	  Ulaanbaatar.	  
	  
Given	  this	  uneasy	  commingling	  of	  hatred	  and	  desire,	  research	  into	  the	  daily	  
experience	  and	  practices	  of	  “bad	  subjects”	  can	  be	  especially	  illuminating.	  Many	  
groups	  of	  Mongols	  can,	  for	  one	  reason	  or	  another,	  be	  considered	  “bad	  subjects,”	  but,	  
as	  touched	  upon	  earlier,	  one	  such	  group	  is	  women,	  whose	  bodies	  and	  generative	  
capacity	  are	  discursively	  harnessed	  for	  the	  common	  good.	  For	  these	  national	  subjects,	  
relationships	  with	  Chinese	  men	  are	  potentially	  dangerous	  and	  frequently	  secretive.	  




Because	  in	  the	  Mongolian	  cultural	  region	  ethnicity	  is	  conceptualized	  as	  being	  
transmitted	  through	  the	  father’s	  line,	  intimacy	  with	  the	  Chinese	  is	  particularly	  
problematic	  for	  women.	  Mongols	  may	  not	  look	  too	  kindly	  on	  a	  Mongolian	  man	  
entering	  into	  a	  relationship	  with	  a	  Chinese	  woman,	  but	  such	  occurrences,	  if	  they	  do	  
happen,	  do	  not	  carry	  the	  same	  weight.	  What	  is	  particularly	  striking	  is	  that	  the	  Chinese,	  
both	  men	  and	  women,	  are	  never	  portrayed	  as	  physically	  or	  sexually	  attractive.	  
Chinese	  men	  are	  consistently	  imagined	  as	  rich	  and	  successful,	  and	  their	  appeal	  with	  
Mongolian	  women	  is	  thus	  articulated	  on	  poverty	  and/or	  greed.	  Unfailingly	  these	  
stories	  are	  narrated	  as	  cautionary	  tales	  in	  which	  innocent	  (and/or	  selfish)	  women	  enter	  
into	  relations	  or	  marry	  Chinese	  men	  for	  financial	  reasons.	  Lacking	  this	  competitive	  
edge	  (insofar	  as	  men	  are	  conceptualized	  as	  breadwinners),	  and	  perceived	  as	  less	  
attractive	  than	  their	  Mongolian	  counterparts,	  Chinese	  women	  are	  never	  perceived	  as	  
potential	  mates,	  which	  certainly	  contributes	  to	  making	  such	  unions	  invisible.	  
	  
These	  various	  factors	  combine	  to	  position	  Mongolian	  women	  at	  a	  particularly	  
significant	  juncture	  of	  identity	  and	  nationhood.	  The	  Mongols’	  right	  to	  protect	  their	  
traditional	  way	  of	  life	  and	  culture	  demands	  sacrifices,	  but	  these	  sacrifices	  are	  not	  
exacted	  equally	  from	  all.	  The	  differential	  between	  which	  group	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  
socially	  responsible	  and	  who	  has	  the	  power	  to	  define	  what	  these	  responsibilities	  are	  
highlights	  the	  gendered	  power	  structure	  undergirding	  the	  community.	  In	  Mongolia	  
like	  elsewhere,	  nationalism	  “turn[s]	  the	  control	  of	  women,	  their	  bodies	  and	  their	  
sexuality	  into	  a	  matter	  of	  national	  importance	  by	  defining	  patriarchy	  as	  the	  core	  of	  
national	  identity”	  (Undarya	  Tumursukh	  2001:	  122).	  As	  was	  described	  earlier,	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nationalist	  groups	  such	  as	  Dayaar	  Mongol	  have	  made	  this	  role	  very	  explicit	  by	  
threatening	  to	  shave	  off	  the	  hair	  of	  women	  who	  have	  relations	  with	  Chinese	  men,	  
using	  these	  threats	  as	  modes	  of	  discipline	  to	  impose	  strict	  allegiance	  to	  a	  national	  
cause	  modeled	  on	  communal	  resistance	  against	  China.	  
	  
Against	  this	  background	  of	  (largely	  male)	  national	  paranoia	  (Billé	  2008),	  some	  
specifically	  female	  strategies	  come	  to	  the	  fore.	  With	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “strategy”	  
here	  rather	  than	  “resistance,”	  I	  am	  drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  dangers	  of	  painting	  
Mongolian	  women	  as	  a	  cohesive	  group,	  defined	  in	  opposition	  to	  a	  similarly	  cohesive	  
cohort	  of	  male	  nationalists.	  Here	  “strategy”	  is	  akin	  to	  de	  Certeau’s	  (1990)	  “tactics”	  and	  
affords	  us	  a	  certain	  theoretical	  leeway.	  As	  Kandiyoti	  reminds	  us	  (1991,	  378),	  women	  
both	  participate	  actively	  in,	  and	  can	  become	  hostage	  to,	  national	  projects.	  As	  such,	  
they	  can	  strategize	  and	  negotiate	  personal	  niches	  while	  remaining	  implicitly	  aligned	  
with	  national	  and	  communal	  concerns.	  As	  I	  will	  illustrate	  later,	  acceptance	  of,	  and	  
resistance	  to,	  the	  national	  project	  often	  cohabit	  within	  the	  same	  individual.	  Despite	  
nationalism	  being	  largely	  male-­‐driven,	  women	  often	  do	  support	  and	  promote	  the	  
nationalist	  cause	  (see	  for	  instance	  Blee	  1991,	  Scheck	  2004).	  
	  
Even	  when	  explicitly	  supporting	  nationalist	  views	  –	  at	  times	  vocally	  urging	  other	  
women	  not	  to	  “betray	  the	  nation”	  by	  associating	  with	  Chinese	  men	  –	  many	  Mongolian	  
women	  feel	  somewhat	  disillusioned	  by	  the	  gender	  norms	  and	  expectations	  delineated	  
by	  contemporary	  Mongolianness.	  The	  double	  burden	  of	  work	  and	  domestic	  duties,	  
carried	  out	  often	  single-­‐handedly,	  renders	  especially	  attractive	  the	  prospect	  of	  living	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abroad	  and	  marrying	  a	  foreigner	  who	  works	  and	  does	  not	  drink.	  Aware	  of	  the	  
difficulties	  faced	  by	  Mongolian	  women	  in	  finding	  a	  good,	  hard-­‐working	  and	  
financially-­‐secure	  husband,	  some	  families	  actively	  encourage	  their	  daughters	  to	  study	  
foreign	  languages	  in	  the	  hope	  they’ll	  marry	  a	  rich	  foreigner,	  but	  such	  practices	  remain	  
subject	  to	  social	  opprobrium	  and	  often	  lead	  to	  permanent	  emigration.	  
In	  fact,	  a	  large	  contingent	  of	  Mongolian	  women	  is	  actively	  looking	  for	  a	  foreign	  
husband	  and	  several	  introduction	  agencies	  in	  Ulaanbaatar	  cater	  specially	  for	  them.	  
The	  largest	  one,	  Hos	  bagana,7	  with	  several	  hundred	  women	  on	  its	  registers,	  facilitates	  
contacts	  between	  Mongolian	  women	  and	  men	  from	  Japan,	  Korea,	  Western	  Europe	  
and	  America;	  two	  other	  ones,	  Ariun	  hair	  (“Pure	  love”)	  and	  Mönhiin	  zaluu	  hair	  (“Youth’s	  
eternal	  love”),	  focus	  specifically	  on	  introductions	  to	  Korean	  men.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
latter	  two,	  the	  geographical	  focus	  represents	  less	  a	  cultural	  preference	  than	  available	  
opportunities.	  As	  South	  Korea	  is	  a	  major	  importer	  of	  Mongolian	  workers,	  numerous	  
ties	  and	  connections	  exist	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  and	  the	  managers	  of	  the	  latter	  
two	  agencies	  both	  have	  personal	  contacts	  there.	  These	  two	  agencies	  differ	  in	  various	  
ways	  from	  Hos	  bagana	  but	  the	  greatest	  difference	  is	  perhaps	  the	  kind	  of	  women	  that	  
are	  found	  on	  their	  registers.	  The	  clients	  of	  the	  latter	  two	  are	  mostly	  women	  in	  their	  
early	  twenties,	  sometimes	  even	  younger,	  fresh	  out	  of	  high	  school	  or	  first	  and	  second-­‐
year	  university	  students.	  On	  their	  registration	  forms,	  they	  predominantly	  state	  that	  
they’re	  looking	  for	  a	  better	  life	  elsewhere.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  women	  on	  the	  largest	  
agency’s	  registers	  tend	  to	  be	  educated,	  professional	  women	  in	  their	  late	  thirties.	  
According	  to	  Naraa,	  the	  director	  of	  Hos	  bagana,	  many	  of	  these	  educated	  women	  have	  
difficulties	  finding	  a	  mate.	  Having	  prioritized	  their	  education	  and	  career,	  they	  often	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find	  that	  men	  with	  a	  similar	  education	  to	  theirs	  prefer	  a	  younger	  spouse,	  frequently	  
privileging	  physical	  rather	  than	  educational	  qualities.	  Disillusioned	  by	  the	  Mongolian	  
men	  available	  to	  them,	  they	  contact	  introduction	  agencies	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  finding	  a	  
husband	  abroad.	  
	  
Interestingly,	  despite	  physical	  proximity	  to	  China,	  none	  of	  the	  three	  agencies	  
operating	  in	  Ulaanbaatar	  offers	  introductions	  to	  Chinese	  men.	  When	  I	  asked	  Naraa	  
why	  there	  aren’t	  any	  Chinese	  men	  on	  her	  registers,	  she	  shrugged	  and	  responded	  that	  
women	  wanting	  to	  meet	  Chinese	  men	  don’t	  come	  to	  the	  agency:	  “They	  meet	  them	  by	  
themselves.	  Why	  should	  it	  be	  up	  to	  us	  to	  introduce	  them?”	  (Örsdöö	  l	  tanilstdag	  biz.	  
Binüüs	  zaaval	  tedniig	  zuuchlah	  geed	  ch	  yaahuu?).	  For	  her	  as	  well,	  “love”	  does	  not	  enter	  
the	  equation	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  Sino-­‐Mongolian	  relationships.	  Seen	  as	  the	  unfortunate	  
precipitate	  of	  financial	  greed,	  desperation	  and	  naivety,	  such	  unions	  are	  imagined	  to	  
take	  place	  surreptitiously,	  in	  nightclubs	  or	  around	  construction	  sites	  where	  Chinese	  
men	  work.	  They’re	  certainly	  not	  actively	  sought.	  In	  practice,	  however,	  far	  more	  unions	  
between	  Chinese	  and	  Mongols	  take	  place	  than	  are	  usually	  imagined.	  A	  few	  interviews	  
carried	  out	  with	  Chinese	  families	  living	  in	  the	  Hailaast	  district	  of	  Ulaanbaatar	  were	  
very	  revealing	  in	  this	  regard.	  These	  families,	  mostly	  hailing	  from	  the	  northern	  
provinces	  of	  China	  but	  some	  coming	  from	  further	  south,	  have	  settled	  permanently	  in	  
Mongolia.	  When	  they	  came	  in	  search	  of	  work	  in	  the	  1950s,	  these	  Chinese	  settlers	  were	  
living	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  Gandan,	  the	  most	  important	  Buddhist	  monastery	  just	  west	  of	  
central	  Ulaanbaatar.	  They	  relocated	  to	  the	  north	  of	  the	  city	  in	  the	  late	  1970’s,	  when	  
their	  area	  (ger	  horoolol)	  was	  razed	  to	  make	  space	  for	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  temple	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complex.	  Many	  homes	  in	  the	  Hailaast	  district	  are	  the	  traditional	  pingfang	  found	  in	  
northern	  China	  (Fig.	  3)	  and	  thus	  differ	  starkly	  from	  the	  usual	  Mongolian	  ger	  
enclosures.8	  While	  these	  Chinese	  houses	  are	  numerous	  in	  this	  area,	  they	  do	  not	  
constitute	  a	  “Chinatown”	  sealed	  off	  from	  the	  rest,	  and	  Mongol	  dwellings	  are	  also	  
found	  throughout	  the	  area.	  	  
	  
<insert	  Fig3.jpg>	  
Figure	  3:	  Chinese	  dwelling	  with	  courtyard	  and	  buildings	  in	  adobe	  typical	  of	  northern	  
China.	  Hailaast	  district,	  Ulaanbaatar.	  Photo	  by	  the	  author,	  July	  2007	  
	  
What	  these	  interviews	  and	  informal	  chats	  highlighted	  was	  the	  high	  level	  of	  integration	  
of	  these	  Chinese	  residents	  within	  Mongolian	  society	  and	  general	  acceptance	  at	  the	  
local	  level.	  In	  fact,	  it	  was	  precisely	  because	  of	  this	  high	  integration	  that	  the	  existence	  
of	  this	  Chinese	  neighborhood	  came	  to	  my	  attention	  so	  late	  in	  my	  fieldwork.9	  	  
	  
Tsetsegmaa	  is	  one	  of	  these	  second-­‐generation	  Chinese	  immigrants.	  	  Equally	  at	  ease	  in	  
Chinese	  and	  Mongolian,	  she	  works	  as	  a	  translator	  for	  a	  Mongolian	  construction	  
company	  that	  imports	  Chinese	  labor.	  Her	  parents	  moved	  to	  Mongolia	  in	  1957	  in	  search	  
of	  work.	  Having	  come	  from	  Sichuan,	  they	  were	  somewhat	  unusual	  among	  Chinese	  
immigrants	  who	  predominantly	  hail	  from	  the	  northern	  provinces	  of	  Hebei	  and	  
Shaanxi.	  Since	  the	  passing	  away	  of	  her	  husband	  twenty	  years	  ago,	  Tsetsegmaa’s	  
mother	  continued	  raising	  her	  children	  on	  her	  own.	  She	  now	  lives	  in	  the	  northern	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district	  of	  Chingeltei	  and	  spends	  her	  days	  socializing	  with	  Chinese	  friends,	  playing	  
mahjong	  with	  them	  or	  watching	  Chinese	  television.	  Because	  she	  does	  not	  follow	  the	  
local	  media	  and	  because	  her	  knowledge	  of	  Mongolian	  is	  limited,	  she	  is	  not	  fully	  aware	  
of	  the	  current	  prevalence	  of	  anti-­‐Chinese	  narratives.	  
	  
Tsetsegmaa,	  by	  contrast,	  as	  an	  intermediary	  between	  Chinese	  construction	  workers	  
and	  their	  Mongolian	  employer,	  is	  confronted	  with	  them	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  Her	  
responses	  are	  multifaceted	  and	  complex.	  On	  some	  level	  she	  understands	  the	  
sensitivity	  of	  the	  issue	  of	  Mongolian	  independence,	  but	  she	  is	  also	  aware	  that	  
xenophobic	  narratives	  painting	  Chinese	  workers	  as	  hooligans	  and	  criminals	  have	  been	  
actively	  whipped	  up	  by	  a	  number	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  actors.	  She	  believes,	  for	  
instance,	  that	  some	  Mongolian	  construction	  companies	  have	  conveniently	  exploited	  
these	  sentiments	  to	  expel	  their	  workers	  before	  the	  end	  of	  their	  contract,	  thereby	  
avoiding	  having	  to	  pay	  them.	  
	  
In	  her	  personal	  life,	  however,	  she	  has	  not	  experienced	  ethnic	  antagonism.	  In	  the	  
district	  of	  Hailaast	  where	  she	  resides,	  she	  says	  that	  many	  of	  the	  second-­‐generation	  
immigrants	  have	  married	  Mongols	  and	  that	  these	  unions	  are	  largely	  successful.	  Her	  
teenage	  son	  is	  even	  better	  integrated	  than	  she	  is.	  He	  can	  speak	  Chinese,	  and	  indeed	  
does	  so	  with	  his	  grandmother,	  but	  he	  goes	  to	  a	  Mongolian	  school	  and	  all	  his	  
classmates	  and	  friends	  are	  Mongols.	  In	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  vociferous	  anti-­‐Chinese	  
rhetoric	  voiced	  in	  the	  media,	  Sino-­‐Mongolian	  encounters	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  
perceived	  in	  the	  same	  negative	  light	  by	  all.	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Perhaps	  more	  striking	  is	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  discourse	  and	  practices	  witnessed	  
at	  the	  level	  of	  sexualized	  relations,	  particularly	  with	  regards	  to	  prostitution.	  As	  was	  
discussed	  previously,	  the	  monetized	  sexual	  intimacy	  of	  Mongolian	  girls	  (hüühnüüd)	  
with	  Chinese	  men	  is	  central	  to	  anti-­‐Chinese	  rhetoric.	  Perceived	  as	  sexual	  predators	  
taking	  advantage	  of	  naïve	  and/or	  impoverished	  girls,	  or	  as	  agents	  of	  the	  Chinese	  state,	  
Chinese	  men	  are	  one	  of	  the	  main	  dangers	  facing	  the	  Mongolian	  nation,	  it	  is	  held.	  
However	  interviews	  carried	  out	  with	  a	  number	  of	  young	  women	  working	  as	  
prostitutes	  in	  Ulaanbaatar	  paints	  a	  very	  different	  picture.	  Several	  of	  them	  described	  
Chinese	  customers	  as	  gentle	  (zöölön),	  courteous	  (eeldeg)	  and	  compassionate	  
(enerengüi),	  very	  good	  people	  inside	  (dotroo	  ih	  goy	  hümüüs	  baidag).	  Also,	  contrary	  to	  
culturally-­‐held	  beliefs,	  they	  often	  found	  Chinese	  customers	  to	  be	  generous	  and	  
friendly,	  unlike	  Russians	  or	  other	  Westerners	  who	  are	  tight	  (nariin	  hümüüs)	  and	  discuss	  
prices	  in	  a	  cold,	  detached	  manner.	  As	  Baigalmaa	  explains:	  “Mongols	  are	  told	  from	  a	  
young	  age	  that	  the	  Chinese	  are	  bad,	  but	  in	  reality	  they’re	  good	  people	  (sain	  hümüüs),	  
gentle	  (zöölön).	  If	  the	  girl	  says	  it	  hurts	  they	  will	  say	  ‘za’	  and	  stop.”	  Inner	  Mongols	  are	  
similarly	  portrayed	  rather	  positively,	  “often	  asking	  the	  girl	  afterwards	  why	  they’re	  
doing	  that	  kind	  of	  job,	  and	  saying	  they	  want	  to	  help	  them.	  They're	  not	  a	  bad	  lot	  (muu	  
hümüüs	  bish).”	  
	  
Two	  other	  sex	  workers	  I	  interviewed	  had	  a	  similar	  positive	  experience	  of	  China	  and	  
Chinese.	  After	  finishing	  high	  school,	  they	  started	  working	  in	  a	  sauna	  in	  Ulaanbaatar	  in	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2005	  and	  that's	  how	  they	  met	  and	  became	  friends.	  A	  year	  later,	  they	  met	  an	  Inner	  
Mongol	  who	  invited	  them	  to	  work	  in	  China:	  
	  
We	  liked	  it.	  We	  worked	  in	  a	  big	  place,	  very	  clean,	  much	  cleaner	  than	  in	  
Ulaanbaatar.	  The	  people	  there	  were	  educated	  (hümüüs	  n	  soyoltoi).	  Except	  
for	  another	  Mongol,	  the	  other	  girls	  working	  in	  town	  were	  either	  Chinese	  or	  
Russian,	  so	  we	  had	  good	  business	  as	  we	  were	  unusual.	  We	  rated	  much	  
higher	  than	  the	  local	  Chinese,	  we	  were	  on	  a	  par	  with	  the	  Russian	  girls.	  	  
	  
When	  we	  were	  invited	  to	  work	  in	  China	  we	  weren’t	  scared.	  We	  were	  taken	  
to	  nice	  places	  and	  treated	  well.	  We	  never	  got	  any	  pressure	  from	  anybody.	  
Maybe	  we’ll	  go	  back,	  we	  haven’t	  decided	  yet.	  People	  there	  are	  asking	  us	  to	  
come	  back.	  
	  
These	  personal	  accounts	  are	  remarkable	  insofar	  as	  they	  show	  China	  (and	  Chinese	  
men)	  in	  a	  very	  different	  light.	  While	  in	  the	  Mongolian	  media	  Chinese	  men	  are	  
portrayed	  as	  aggressors,	  requiring	  Mongolian	  men	  to	  defend	  and	  come	  to	  the	  rescue	  
of	  Mongolian	  women,	  the	  experience	  of	  these	  sex-­‐workers	  by	  contrast	  codes	  
Mongolian	  nationalists	  as	  the	  main	  threat	  to	  watch	  out	  for,	  while	  the	  Chinese	  
customers	  are	  friendly,	  gentle	  and	  generous.	  
	  
These	  various	  female	  experiences	  of	  the	  Other	  shed	  light	  on	  particular	  processes	  and	  
articulations	  that	  tend	  to	  become	  muffled	  by	  the	  clamor	  of	  anti-­‐Chinese	  rhetoric.	  It	  is	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by	  listening	  to	  these	  voices	  that	  the	  force	  of	  nationalist	  homogenization	  becomes	  
most	  clearly	  visible.	  In	  fact,	  in	  some	  of	  these	  narratives	  the	  traditional	  roles	  of	  
aggressor/ally	  are	  reversed.	  
	  
The	  personal	  experience	  of	  Dulmaa,	  a	  trader	  at	  one	  of	  Ulaanbaatar’s	  main	  
supermarkets	  makes	  this	  especially	  explicit.	  Around	  forty	  years	  old,	  Dulmaa	  co-­‐owns	  
a	  stall	  with	  a	  Chinese	  man	  where	  she	  sells	  various	  canned	  food	  products	  from	  China.	  I	  
first	  mistook	  her	  for	  a	  Chinese.	  Well-­‐educated,	  she	  speaks	  flawless	  Russian	  and	  her	  
English	  is	  also	  excellent.	  She	  doesn’t	  speak	  Chinese,	  however,	  and	  communicates	  in	  
English	  with	  her	  business	  partner	  who	  is	  also	  her	  friend.	  She	  explains	  that	  she	  has	  
been	  working	  in	  this	  supermarket	  for	  several	  years:	  
I	  was	  the	  first	  person	  to	  import	  Chinese	  goods,	  and	  a	  couple	  of	  years	  later	  
other	  traders	  here	  started	  doing	  the	  same,	  but	  they	  import	  from	  Erlian10	  
and	  the	  products	  are	  either	  fakes	  or	  they	  have	  expired	  and	  a	  new	  expiry	  
date	  has	  been	  stuck	  onto	  the	  bottle.	  So	  other	  people	  can	  sell	  for	  30	  percent	  
less,	  but	  I	  won’t	  do	  that.	  The	  Chinese	  restaurant	  owners	  in	  Ulaanbaatar	  
know	  my	  products	  are	  genuine	  and	  they	  come	  and	  shop	  here.	  But	  
Mongolian-­‐owned	  Chinese	  restaurants	  usually	  buy	  the	  cheaper	  products.	  
	  
She	  tells	  me	  that,	  unlike	  most	  Mongols,	  she	  actually	  likes	  China,	  and	  respects	  the	  
Chinese	  government:	  “They’re	  doing	  a	  good	  job,	  making	  sure	  their	  people	  don’t	  
starve.”	  She	  believes	  that	  Mongolian	  women	  have	  a	  good	  head	  for	  business	  and	  that	  
Chinese	  men	  make	  for	  excellent	  partners:	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I	  know	  several	  Mongolian	  women	  who	  are	  married	  to	  Chinese	  men;	  they	  all	  
live	  in	  China,	  and	  they’re	  doing	  well.	  Chinese	  men	  are	  supportive,	  unlike	  
Mongolian	  men,	  who	  are	  lazy	  and	  just	  drink.	  
	  
But	  this	  business	  relationship	  with	  a	  Chinese	  man	  has	  created	  numerous	  difficulties	  
for	  her.	  Other	  female	  traders	  (most	  stalls	  are	  run	  by	  women)	  have	  exerted	  pressure	  on	  
her	  to	  leave	  her	  stall.	  Getting	  hassled	  by	  the	  police	  is	  a	  regular	  occurrence	  for	  her:	  
	  
They	  come	  and	  check,	  but	  everything	  is	  in	  order	  and	  I	  am	  a	  Mongolian	  
citizen	  so	  they	  can’t	  do	  anything,	  really.	  But	  twice	  I	  was	  made	  bankrupt	  
because	  of	  the	  pressure	  I	  face.	  I	  don’t	  make	  a	  lot	  of	  money,	  just	  enough	  to	  
live	  on,	  but	  I’m	  honest.	  In	  Mongolia	  it’s	  impossible	  to	  get	  rich	  if	  you’re	  
honest….	  
	  
Both	  for	  her,	  and	  for	  the	  sex	  workers	  introduced	  earlier,	  despite	  the	  nationalist	  
discourses	  painting	  the	  Chinese	  as	  ruthless	  exploiters,	  and	  warnings	  of	  other	  Mongols	  
against	  fraternizing	  with	  them,	  the	  very	  pressure	  exerted	  by	  other	  Mongols	  is	  what	  
causes	  them	  considerable	  distress.	  Importantly,	  these	  vignettes	  show	  that	  the	  
tendency	  to	  paint	  nationalist	  priorities	  as	  exclusively	  male	  endeavors	  poses	  the	  risk	  of	  
constructing	  a	  framework	  in	  which	  women	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  pacifist,	  social-­‐welfare-­‐
oriented	  and	  apolitical	  (Blee	  1991,	  3).	  In	  this	  last	  example,	  the	  disciplinary	  arm	  of	  
national	  morality	  is	  wielded	  by	  the	  other	  females	  who	  work	  in	  the	  supermarket.	  They	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are	  the	  ones	  who,	  by	  calling	  on	  the	  police,	  collude	  with	  the	  dominant	  forces	  who	  also	  
work	  to	  keep	  them	  in	  a	  socially	  subservient	  position.	  	  
 
Conclusion 
I	  have	  argued	  in	  this	  article	  that	  the	  anti-­‐Chinese	  statements	  that	  have	  become	  
pervasive	  in	  contemporary	  Mongolia	  constitute	  an	  indirect	  interpellation	  insofar	  as	  
they	  are	  overtly	  about	  the	  Chinese	  but	  in	  reality	  do	  something	  altogether	  different.	  
Essentially,	  Sinophobia	  functions	  as	  a	  vector	  of	  cultural	  and	  social	  cohesion.	  As	  a	  
discursively-­‐embedded	  enunciative	  practice	  that	  largely	  excludes	  the	  Chinese	  from	  its	  
intended	  audience,	  Sinophobia	  has	  become	  central	  to	  contemporary	  
conceptualizations	  of	  Mongolianness.	  Frequently	  interpreted	  as	  reactive	  and	  
articulated	  on	  self-­‐defense,	  anti-­‐Chinese	  violence	  is	  in	  fact	  productive	  insofar	  as	  it	  
seeks	  to	  produce	  difference	  and	  demarcate	  the	  nation’s	  cultural	  and	  ethnic	  contours.	  
However	  the	  equivalence	  explicitly	  drawn	  between	  anti-­‐Chinese	  sentiments	  and	  
patriotism	  has	  proven	  extremely	  damaging	  to	  women,	  who	  frequently	  bear	  the	  brunt	  
of	  this	  Sinophobic	  discourse.	  For	  those	  who	  are	  in	  a	  relationship	  with	  a	  Chinese	  man	  in	  
particular,	  the	  structural	  difficulty	  of	  distancing	  themselves	  from	  anti-­‐Chinese	  
discursive	  practices	  is	  often	  irreconcilable	  with	  the	  reality	  of	  their	  emotional	  life,	  
thereby	  leading	  to	  considerable	  cognitive	  dissonance	  and,	  ultimately,	  outmigration.11	  
	  
The	  social	  implications	  of	  Sinophobic	  discourse	  extend	  far	  beyond	  the	  groups	  I	  have	  
mentioned	  here.	  Despite	  being	  employed	  by	  a	  number	  of	  political	  and	  social	  actors	  as	  
a	  rallying	  call,	  anti-­‐Chinese	  narratives	  seamlessly	  seep	  into	  the	  entire	  Mongolian	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population,	  leading	  to	  a	  pervasive	  climate	  of	  suspicion	  and	  paranoia.	  Because	  of	  the	  
difficulties	  inherent	  in	  identifying	  who	  may	  or	  may	  not	  have	  Chinese	  ancestry,	  any	  
Mongol’s	  ethnic	  purity	  ultimately	  hinges	  on	  discursive	  performativity.	  As	  a	  number	  of	  
Mongolian	  authors	  have	  pointed	  out	  (see	  for	  instance	  Baabar	  2005,	  215-­‐220),	  any	  
refusal	  to	  partake	  in	  Sinophobic	  speech	  can	  be	  read	  as	  a	  lack	  of	  patriotism	  and	  as	  a	  
potential	  sign	  of	  genetic	  hybridity.	  Anti-­‐Chinese	  statements	  are	  thus	  more	  than	  a	  
patriotic	  utterance:	  they	  are	  a	  performative	  exercise	  through	  which	  the	  speaker	  
discursively	  reiterates	  his	  or	  her	  own	  Mongolianness	  in	  the	  form	  of	  citational	  and	  
highly	  formulaic	  statements.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  makes	  it	  extremely	  difficult	  for	  any	  Mongol	  
to	  publicly	  question	  these	  established	  practices	  and	  to	  attempt	  a	  reconfiguration	  of	  
Mongolianness	  not	  articulated	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  the	  figure	  of	  China.	  
	  
The	  “bad	  subjects”	  described	  here	  are	  in	  this	  sense	  nothing	  less	  than	  dissidents.	  By	  
engaging	  in	  business	  ventures,	  friendships	  or	  sexual	  relations	  with	  Chinese,	  they	  
directly	  challenge	  core	  cultural	  assumptions.	  Far	  from	  representing	  a	  threat	  to	  
Mongolia	  and	  Mongolian	  culture,	  I	  suggest	  that	  on	  the	  contrary	  their	  actions	  open	  up	  
an	  important	  reflexive	  space	  in	  contemporary	  Mongolian	  politics.	  But	  while	  the	  
ethnography	  I	  have	  presented	  here	  showcases	  the	  difficulties	  encountered	  by	  some	  
Mongolian	  women	  with	  respect	  to	  national	  discourses	  and	  narratives,	  the	  assumption	  
that	  all	  women	  are	  in	  a	  position	  of	  resistance	  is	  nonetheless	  facile.	  Indeed,	  what	  the	  
experience	  of	  Dulmaa	  clearly	  demonstrates	  is	  that	  while	  some	  women	  do	  bear	  the	  
brunt	  of	  an	  ideology	  articulated	  on	  resistance	  against	  a	  common	  enemy,	  others	  
participate	  fully	  and	  willingly	  in	  the	  nationalist	  project.	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Likewise,	  the	  problematic	  positioning	  of	  the	  embryonic	  gay	  Mongolian	  community,	  
which	  I	  have	  discussed	  elsewhere	  (Billé	  2010b),	  illustrates	  the	  dangers	  inherent	  in	  
construing	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  group	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  mainstream	  as	  necessarily	  
constituting	  resistance.	  If	  gay	  men	  in	  Mongolia	  can	  feel	  socially	  excluded	  to	  the	  extent	  
that	  they	  are	  perceived	  as	  deviating	  from	  Mongolian	  heteronormative	  ideas	  of	  
masculinity,	  they	  can	  still	  collude	  nonetheless	  with	  a	  dominant	  discourse	  that	  
oppresses	  women.	  Conversely,	  women	  may	  be	  very	  vocal	  about	  their	  difficult	  position	  
with	  respect	  to	  national	  discourse	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  expect	  men	  to	  “act	  like	  
men”	  and	  be	  vocal	  critics	  of	  homosexuality.	  It	  is	  thus	  crucial	  not	  to	  romanticize	  actions	  
which	  in	  some	  cases	  may	  be	  simply	  pragmatic	  –	  for	  reasons	  of	  anonymity	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  gay	  men,	  or	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  economic	  migration	  for	  some	  Mongolian	  women.	  
	  
Finally,	  in	  using	  the	  insights	  of	  theorists	  such	  as	  J.	  L.	  Austin	  and	  Judith	  Butler,	  my	  aim	  
in	  this	  article	  has	  been	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  a	  fundamental	  dimension	  that	  is	  too	  rarely	  
integrated	  in	  discussions	  of	  xenophobia.	  Yet	  performative	  and	  illocutionary	  
utterances	  constitute	  a	  fundamental	  dimension	  of	  hate	  speech.	  Indeed,	  as	  Sara	  
Ahmed	  (2004:	  51-­‐52)	  has	  noted,	  through	  performative	  utterances,	  the	  speaker	  
primarily	  makes	  a	  statement	  about	  herself.	  This	  aspect	  comes	  out	  clearly	  in	  the	  very	  
formulaicity	  of	  xenophobic	  speech,	  which	  do	  not	  seek	  to	  contribute	  a	  new	  piece	  of	  
information	  but	  merely	  to	  relay	  an	  emotion	  or	  affect.	  Effectively	  the	  communication	  
is	  phatic:	  it	  is	  concerned	  less	  with	  the	  transmission	  of	  an	  actual	  message	  than	  with	  the	  
technical	  function	  of	  language	  to	  maintain	  social	  relations	  (see	  Jakobson	  1960).	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Through	  the	  phatic	  function	  ‘the	  addresser	  and	  the	  addressee	  check	  whether	  they	  are	  
using	  the	  same	  code’	  (Žižek	  2008,	  79).	  
	  
A	  further	  crucial	  remark	  made	  by	  Eve	  Kosofsky	  Sedgwick	  (2003,	  69-­‐70)	  must	  also	  be	  
included	  here,	  namely	  that	  all	  performative	  utterances	  essentially	  involve	  a	  third	  actor	  
who	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  present,	  but	  who	  is	  nonetheless	  called	  upon	  as	  a	  witness	  of	  
the	  act.	  This	  argument	  can,	  I	  suggest,	  be	  productively	  extended	  to	  all	  forms	  of	  
xenophobic	  discourse.	  As	  a	  performative	  utterance,	  xenophobia	  is	  thus	  not	  simply	  
reflective	  of	  a	  relationship	  between	  Self	  and	  Other;	  it	  ultimately	  requires	  the	  
installation	  of	  an	  interlocutory	  triad.	  In	  uttering	  an	  anti-­‐Chinese	  statement,	  a	  
Mongolian	  speaker	  spontaneously	  enters	  into	  a	  three-­‐way	  conversation	  which	  
discursively	  includes	  himself,	  the	  ideological	  figure	  of	  the	  Chinese,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  















                                                
1	   To	  ensure	  the	  safety	  of	  my	  interlocutors,	  all	  names	  in	  this	  article	  were	  changed.	  An	  exception	  was	  made	  
for	  my	  friend	  and	  assistant	  Otgonhüü,	  who	  preferred	  I	  use	  her	  real	  name.	  
2	   I	  am	  using	  in	  this	  paper	  the	  terms	  “hate	  speech”	  and	  “injurious	  speech”	  indiscriminately,	  to	  refer	  to	  any	  
form	  of	  xenophobic	  speech	  addressed	  to	  a	  foreign	  or	  ethnic	  Other.	  
3	  	   Mongols	  have	  also	  consistently	  faced	  dangers	  linked	  to	  the	  environment,	  such	  as	  zud,	  which	  are	  natural	  
disasters	  linked	  to	  excessive	  droughts	  or	  excessive	  snow.	  
4	  	   A	   survey	   carried	   out	   by	   the	  National	   Centre	   Against	   Violence	   in	   1998	   estimates	   that	   one	  woman	   in	  
three	  experiences	  domestic	  violence	  (CHRD	  2000).	  
5	  	   Of	  course	  this	   is	  not	  the	  case	  for	  Inner	  Mongols,	  who	  identify	  as	  Mongols	  and	  frequently	  speak	  fluent	  
Mongolian	  yet	  are	  considered	  Chinese	  by	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  Mongolian	  population.	  
6	  	   Thus	  Batsaihan	  heard	  his	  Mongolian	  waitresses	  call	  his	  Chinese	  cook	  by	  injurious	  names,	  but	  only	  when	  
they	  thought	  he	  wasn’t	  around.	  
7	  	   The	  bagana	  is	  the	  supporting	  wooden	  pole	  in	  the	  ger	  (see	  following	  note),	  while	  hos	  means	  ‘a	  pair’.	  The	  
name	   thus	   evokes	   the	   complementarity	   and	   shared	   responsibilities	   of	   the	   two	   partners	   in	   the	  
household.	  
8	   Also	  known	  as	  “yurt,”	  the	  ger	  is	  the	  traditional	  felt-­‐covered	  tent	  of	  the	  Mongols	  and	  other	  central	  Asian	  
peoples.	  
9	   It	  was	  only	  by	  chance	  that	  my	  friend	  and	  research	  assistant	  Otgonhüü	  heard	  about	  it	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  2007,	  
after	   nearly	   one	   year	   of	   working	   together.	   As	   far	   as	   I	   could	   tell,	   none	   of	  my	  Mongolian	   friends	   and	  
acquaintances	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  this	  “Chinese	  neighborhood”	  and	  all	  expressed	  surprise	  
when	  I	  discussed	  it	  with	  them.	  
10	  	   Erlian	   (??,	   in	   Mongolian	   “Ereen”)	   is	   the	   first	   Chinese	   city	   encountered	   on	   the	   railway	   line	   linking	  
Mongolia	  to	  China.	  A	  small	  settlement	  until	  the	  early	  1990s,	  it	  has	  mushroomed	  into	  a	  booming	  town	  
since	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  international	  border.	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11	  	   Indeed,	  few	  Sino-­‐Mongolian	  couples	  seem	  to	  settle	  permanently	  in	  Mongolia.	  Despite	  actively	  looking	  
for	  them	  in	  the	  course	  of	  my	  fieldwork,	  most	  of	  the	  couples	  I	  came	  across	  had	  relocated	  to	  China,	  and	  
the	  few	  that	  did	  live	  in	  Mongolia	  consistently	  refused	  to	  meet	  with	  me.	  
References	  
Ahmed,	  Sara.	  2004.	  The	  Cultural	  Politics	  of	  Emotion.	  Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  
Press	  
Althusser,	  Louis.	  1971.	  “Idéologie	  et	  Appareils	  d'Etat,”	  La	  Pensée,	  No.	  151,	  June	  1970	  	  
Austin,	  J.	  L.	  1962.	  How	  to	  Do	  Things	  with	  Words.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  
Press	  
Baabar	  (Bat-­‐Erdene	  Batbayar).	  2005.	  “Tsever	  tsusny	  mongol”	  [The	  pure-­‐blooded	  
Mongol]	  in	  Bidnii	  Aranshin:	  Gurvan	  mongol	  zodoldono	  [Our	  Nature:	  Three	  Mongols	  will	  
fight],	  ed.	  D.	  Bayarhüü.	  Ulaanbaatar:	  Admon	  
Bamana,	  Gaby.	  2008	   On	  the	  Tea	  Road:	  A	  Journey	  into	  Mongolian	  Life	  and	  Culture.	  
Ulaanbaatar:	  Admon	  
Benwell,	  Ann	  Fenger.	  2006.	  “Facing	  Gender	  Challenges	  in	  Post-­‐Socialist	  Mongolia”	  in	  
Mongols	  from	  Country	  to	  City:	  Floating	  Boundaries,	  Pastoralism	  and	  City	  Life	  in	  the	  
Mongol	  Lands,	  eds.	  Ole	  Bruun	  and	  Li	  Narangoa.	  Copenhagen:	  Nordic	  Institute	  of	  Asian	  
Studies	  
Billé,	  Franck.	  2008.	  “Faced	  with	  Extinction:	  Myths	  and	  Urban	  Legends	  in	  
Contemporary	  Mongolia”,	  Cambridge	  Anthropology	  Vol.	  28	  (1):	  34-­‐60.	  	  
Billé,	  Franck.	  2010a.	  “Bodies	  of	  Excess:	  Imagining	  the	  Chinese	  in	  Contemporary	  
Mongolia”,	  Unpublished	  doctoral	  thesis,	  University	  of	  Cambridge	  
Billé,	  Franck.	  2010b.	  “Different	  Shades	  of	  Blue:	  Gay	  Men	  and	  Nationalist	  Discourse	  in	  
Mongolia”.	  Studies	  in	  Ethnicity	  and	  Nationalism,	  Vol.	  10,	  Issue	  2:	  187-­‐203.	  	  
Billé,	  Franck.	  Forthcoming.	  “Nationalism,	  Sexuality	  and	  Dissidence	  in	  Mongolia”	  In	  
Routledge	  Handbook	  of	  Sexuality	  Studies	  in	  East	  Asia,	  eds.	  Mark	  McLelland	  and	  Vera	  
Mackie.	  London:	  Routledge	  
Billig,	  Michael.	  2004.	  Freudian	  Repression:	  Conversation	  Creating	  the	  Unconscious.	  
Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press	  
Blee,	  Kathleen	  M.	  1991.	  Women	  of	  the	  Klan:	  Racism	  and	  Gender	  in	  the	  1920s.	  Berkeley,	  
CA:	  University	  of	  California	  Press	  
Bolormaa,	  H.	  2007.	  “Hyatad,	  solongos	  hoolny	  gazruudyn	  diilenh	  n	  hayaagaa	  avchee”	  
[The	  majority	  of	  Chinese	  and	  Korean	  restaurant	  signs	  are	  taken	  down].	  Önöödör,	  19	  
March	  
Branigan,	  Tanya.	  2010.	  “Mongolian	  neo-­‐Nazis”,	  The	  Guardian,	  2	  August	  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/02/mongolia-­‐far-­‐right	  
 2 
Bulag,	  Uradyn.	  1998.	  Nationalism	  and	  Hybridity	  in	  Mongolia.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Clarendon	  
Press	  
Butler,	  Judith.	  1997.	  Excitable	  Speech.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Routledge	  
Certeau,	  Michel	  de.	  1990.	  L’invention	  du	  quotidien:	  1.	  Arts	  de	  faire.	  Paris:	  Gallimard	  
CHRD.	  2000.	  Mongolia	  National	  Human	  Rights	  Record	  2000.	  Ulaanbaatar.	  Accessed	  
online	  on	  22	  February	  2005	  at	  www.owc.org.mn/chrd/publication/natrec00.doc	  
Erdembileg,	  H.	  2007.	  “Hyatadyn	  manga”	  [The	  Chinese	  Ogre]	  in	  Tolbogüi	  mongol:	  Esse	  
niitlelüüd	  [The	  Spotless	  Mongol:	  A	  Collection	  of	  Essays].	  Ulaanbaatar:	  Admon	  
Harrison,	  David	  K.	  2007.	  When	  Languages	  Die:	  The	  Extinction	  of	  the	  World's	  Languages	  
and	  the	  Erosion	  of	  Human	  Knowledge.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  
Jakobson,	  Roman.	  1960.	  “Closing	  Statement:	  Linguistics	  and	  Poetics”	  in	  Style	  in	  
Language,	  ed.	  Thomas	  Sebeok.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  The	  MIT	  Press	  
Jargal,	  M.	  2007.	  “‘Dayaar	  Mongol’-­‐ynhon	  biee	  ünelegchdyn	  üsiig	  mulzlah	  gej	  bajna”	  
[‘Dayaar	  Mongol’	  to	  shave	  the	  hair	  of	  prostitutes].	  Zuuny	  Medee,	  24	  August	  2007	  
Kandiyoti,	  Deniz.	  1994	  [1991].	  “Identity	  and	  Its	  Discontents:	  Women	  and	  the	  Nation”	  
in	  Colonial	  Discourse	  and	  Post-­‐Colonial	  Theory:	  A	  Reader,	  eds.	  Patrick	  Williams	  and	  
Laura	  Chrisman.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Columbia	  University	  Press	  
King,	  Charles.	  2010.	  Extreme	  Politics:	  Nationalism,	  Violence	  and	  the	  End	  of	  Eastern	  
Europe.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  
L.A.	  Face.	  Fuck	  them	  Chinese.	  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OaFU6UgXKWU	  
Lattimore,	  Owen.	  1962.	  Nomads	  and	  Commissars.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  
Likhachev,	  Vyacheslav.	  2007.	  Political	  Anti-­‐Semitism	  in	  Post-­‐Soviet	  Russia.	  Actors	  and	  
Ideas	  in	  1991-­‐2003.	  Stuttgart:	  Ibidem	  Verlag	  
Rossabi,	  Morris.	  2005.	  Modern	  Mongolia:	  From	  Khans	  to	  Commissars	  to	  Capitalists.	  
Berkeley,	  CA:	  University	  of	  California	  Press	  
Salecl,	  Renata.	  2004.	  On	  Anxiety.	  London:	  Routledge	  
Scheck,	  Raffael.	  2004.	  Mothers	  of	  the	  Nation:	  Right-­‐Wing	  Women	  in	  Weimar	  Germany.	  
Oxford:	  Berg	  
Sedgwick,	  Eve	  Kosofsky.	  2003.	  Touching	  Feeling:	  Affect,	  Pedagogy,	  Performativity.	  
Durham,	  NC:	  Duke	  University	  Press	  
Strasser,	  Roland.	  1930.	  The	  Mongolian	  Horde.	  London:	  Jonathan	  Cape	  &	  Harrison	  
Smith	  
 3 
Undarya	  Tumursukh.	  2001.	  	  “Fighting	  Over	  the	  Reinterpretation	  of	  the	  Mongolian	  
Woman	  in	  Mongolia's	  Post-­‐Socialist	  Identity	  Construction	  Discourse”,	  East	  Asia,	  Vol.	  
19,	  3.	  	  
Yurchak,	  Alexei.	  2006.	  Everything	  Was	  Forever,	  Until	  It	  Was	  No	  More:	  The	  Last	  Soviet	  
Generation.	  Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press	  
Žižek,	  Slavoj.	  2008.	  Violence.	  London:	  Profile	  Books	  
